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STARTUP OF THE BAKU-TBILISI-CEYHAN PIPELINE
POLICYWATCH #998 May 27, 2005
ANALYSIS OF NEAR EAST POLICY FROM THE SCHOLARS AND ASSOCIATES OF THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE
STARTUP OF THE BAKU-TBILISI-CEYHAN PIPELINE: TURKEY'S ENERGY ROLE
By Soner Cagaptay and Nazli Gencsoy
On May 25, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Turkey
inaugurated the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), a major artery linking oil
fields in the Caspian Sea region to the Mediterranean Sea and Western markets
beyond. It will take several months for oil pumped from Baku, Azerbaijan, to
pass through Tbilisi, Georgia, and reach the Turkish coast at Ceyhan.
Eventually, BTC will carry up to 1 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of crude oil
to the Mediterranean. With growing concern over Western dependence on Middle
Eastern oil and rising global oil prices, Turkey is emerging as a key country in
providing Caspian oil to the Western world.
Background: A Pipeline Born of U.S.-Turkish Cooperation
According to British Petroleum's Statistical Review of World Energy, proven oil
reserves in the Caspian Basin total 16.5 billion barrels, comparable to the
reserves of Canada, Mexico, or the OPEC member state Qatar.
President Bill Clinton and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel settled heated
debate in the mid-1990s over how best to bring Caspian oil to world markets by
throwing their weight behind the BTC. Washington and Ankara saw the BTC as a key
east-west corridor that would ensure the independence and economic viability of
the newly independent states in the Caspian Basin. The BTC also made strategic
sense to the United States and Turkey because it would bypass politically
unstable places like Iran, the northern Caucasus (including Chechnya), and
Armenian-occupied parts of Azerbaijan.
Further, the BTC was seen as useful to easing the burdens on the Turkish Straits
of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Today, more than 5,000 tankers cross the
Turkish Straits each year, carrying Caspian oil from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean. The sea traffic through the narrow, zigzagging straits carries
grave risks, especially since any accident could cause an environmental
catastrophe in downtown Istanbul, which sits along the Bosporus.
When others questioned the project's feasibility, Clinton appointed a special
envoy for Caspian energy affairs and Demirel visited Georgia and Azerbaijan to
push for the project. The unprecedented level of U.S.-Turkish cooperation, as
well as successful coordination by both countries' diplomats, made the seemingly
impossible pipeline possible.
Building the BTC
In 1997, Western oil companies started to explore the commercial viability of
the BTC project. An international consortium of eleven partners -- Britain's BP;
Azerbaijan's SOCAR; Norway's Statoil; U.S. based Unocal, Amerada Hess, and
ConocoPhillips; Turkey's TPAO; Italy's Eni; Japan's INPEX and Itochu; and
France's TotalFinaElf -- began construction of the pipeline in May 2003. With a
30 percent share in the project, BP is the largest stakeholder, and served as
acting leader for the project's design and construction phases.
The BTC, which cost an estimated $3.7 billion for construction, financing, and
line-fill, has received limited public funding. The European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation, the
World Bank's private-sector arm, pledged $250 million in loans. Although a small
amount compared to the project's total funding, World Bank participation acted
as a catalyst to bring foreign direct investors to the project.
Because it traverses 176 widely varied and sensitive terrains while crossing the
politically unstable Caucasus region, the BTC was bedeviled by worries about its
security and environmental risks. Accordingly, the U.S. military's Special
Forces trained 1,500-2,000 Georgian soldiers in anti-terrorism techniques under
a $64 million program aimed at protecting the pipeline against saboteurs. In
addition, a BP-led consortium granted an additional $25 million to local
non-governmental organizations to manage environmental programs.
The entire length of the 1,094-mile BTC, the longest oil-export pipeline in the
world, is buried. Once the pipeline becomes fully operational, Azerbaijan will
be the main beneficiary of the sale of its oil in international markets,
collecting (at current prices) about $29 billion per year in oil revenues, while
Georgia and Turkey will respectively collect transit fees of $600 million and
$1.5 billion per year.
Ceyhan Becomes a Nexus of Global Energy Lines
With BTC, Ceyhan will emerge as a major energy supplier to the world. Ceyhan's
port, Yumurtalik, is already the terminus of Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which has
the capacity to bring about 1.5 million bbl/d oil to the Mediterranean from
northern Iraq (though it is presently closed due to continuing attacks by Iraqi
insurgents). Another pipeline is now under consideration to bring Caspian gas
from Baku, via Tbilisi, to Erzurum in eastern Turkey from where it would be
transported to Ceyhan. There are other new projects designed to make Ceyhan into
an even bigger hub of energy supply:
*Samsun-Ceyhan gas/ oil lines and terminal. Turkey intends to enlarge its
natural-gas transmission by extending the Blue Stream pipeline, which connects
Russia with Ankara through the Black Sea, through an Ankara-to-Ceyhan extension.
After a liquid-natural-gas export terminal is built in Ceyhan, this plan would
enable Turkey to re-export Russian gas. Turkey also wants to build a
cross-Anatolian oil line, from Samsun on the Black Sea to Ceyhan on the
Mediterranean, to further decrease traffic through the Turkish Straits.
*Kazakhstan Extension. In March 2005, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan agreed to build
the Aktau-Baku pipeline, connecting the Kashagan offshore oil fields near Aktau
in Kazakhstan to the BTC in Baku via a sub-Caspian in 2008. The Kashagan field
is expected to produce 1.2 million bbl/d by 2016, when 600,000 bbl/d of its
production is to be shipped across the Caspian Sea to be fed into the BTC line.
*Ceyhan-Haifa Pipeline. This project, first discussed during Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's May 2005 visit to Israel, aims to bring BTC oil
to Israel via a sub-Mediterranean pipeline through Cyprus. There are also plans
for parallel pipelines to carry water, gas, and electricity, and perhaps
fiber-optic lines, to Israel, as well as to Northern Cyprus, Jordan, and the
Palestinian territories, bringing the latter closer to Turkey and Israel
economically and politically.
Implications of Turkey's Emergence as an Energy Entrepot
Turkey's new position as a way-station for energy distribution could be a useful
asset in its relations with both the European Union and the United States.
Turkish membership would give the EU a direct route to Caspian energy resources
that does not cross Russia; as a major energy producer; Russia has not been very
helpful getting Caspian energy to outside markets.
In the post-Iraq War period, the energy issue should also strengthen
U.S.-Turkish relations. Turkey's strategic value sometimes comes under doubt.
But Turkey is an important route for the export of oil from northern Iraq. By
binding the Caucasus region with the West through the BTC, Turkey is now a key
country in accessing the energy sources of the landlocked Caspian Basin. And the
BTC has significantly limited the share of Caspian oil that must be transported
through Iran. Tehran currently transports a mere 35,000 bbl/d Caspian oil, which
it buys from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan through a swapping agreement. The BTC
and other projects involving Turkey should remind Americans and Turks alike that
as members of the Western world, they have shared interests that can be promoted
through cooperation.
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program
at The Washington Institute. Nazli Gencsoy, a Dr. Marcia Robbins-Wilf young
scholar, is a research assistant at the Institute.
Copyright 2005 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE for Near East Policy
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