Ottoman Nationalism, European Imperialism (1556-1789)


"The Ottoman Empire Meets Europe..." In 1554, a French diplomat named Ogier Ghiiselin de Busbecq was sent to Istanbul to negotiate a treaty which would protect King Ferdinand, brother of the Hapsburg emperor Charles V and successor as Holy Roman Emperor, from further attack in Hungary. We have his letters, the famous "Turkish Letters" giving us a rather different picture. An excerpt [from the account 'Suleiman the Magnificent' on reserve]:

[of Suleiman]His years are just beginning to tell on him, but his majestic bearing and indeed his whole demeanour are such as besom the lord of so vast an empire. He has always had the character of being a careful and temperate man; even in his early days, when according to the Turkish rule, sin would have been venial, his life was blameless; for not even in youth did he either indulge in wine or commit those unnatural crimes which are common among the Turks; nor could those who were disposed to put the most unfavourable construction on his acts bring anything worse against him than his excessive devotion to his wife, and the precipitate way in which, by her influence, he was induced to put Mustapha to death; for it is commonly believed that it was by her philters and witchcraft that he was led to commit this act.... As an upholder of his religion and its rites he is most strict, being quite as anxious to extend his faith as to extend his empire. ...

Three things Suleiman is said to have set his heart on, namely, to see the building of his mosque finished (which is indeed a costly and beautiful work), by restoring the ancient aqueducts to give Constantinople and abundant supply of water, and to take Vienna. In two of these things, his wishes have been accomplished, in the third he has been stopped, and I hope will be stopped [his mission!]. Vienna he is wont to call by no other name than his disgrace and shame.

According to Halil Inalcik: "these Ottoman enterprises resulted, in the mid-sixteenth century, in a new system of alliances between the states occupying an area stretching from the Atlantic through central Asia, to the Indian Ocean. In this way the European system of balance of power was greatly enlarged. ...[and that] up to 1596 there was no question of international politics which did not somehow involve the Ottomans."

In the famous inscription dating from 1538 Suleiman the magnificent articulated his view of his empire and his power; it is a view consistent with the descriptions we have focussed on of Ottoman expansion -- the maps showing one sultan after another expanding territory:

"I am God's slave ['abd] and sultan of this world. By the grace of God I am head of Muhammad's community. God's might and Muhammad's miracles are my companions. I am Suleyman, in whose name the hube is read in Mecca and Medina. In Baghdad I am the shah, in Byzantine realms the Caesar, and in Egypt the sultan; who sends his fleets to the seas of Europe, the Maghrib and India. I am the sultan who took the crown and throne of Hungary and granted them to a humble slave. The voivoda Petru raised his head in revolt, but my horse's hoofs ground him into the dust, and I conquered the land of Moldavia." [Inalcik, p.41]

This was not without impact on political relations within Europe and between Europe and others of the Ottoman's neighbours.

According to Inalcik, "Francis I later informed the Venetian Ambassador that he considered the Ottoman Empire the only power capable of guaranteeing the existence of the European states against the Hapsburg, the emperor Charles who was accused of seeking to become 'ruler of the world'" -- which was of course Suleiman's goal! It suited the Ottomans to become Frances Ally in this way to prevent a united Europe.

The Ottomans saw the French alliance as the cornerstone of their policy in Europe, and (with the encouragement of the French) sought alliance with the German Lutheran princes who were also fighting Charles V. He encouraged them to continue to support the French and assured them that if the Ottoman armies entered Europe he would grant the princes amnesty. He intimated that he considered the Protestants close to the Muslims since they had risen against the Pope, and that continued support of the Lutherans and Calvinists against Catholicism would remain a keystone of Ottoman policy. Ottoman pressure between 1521 and 1555 forced the Habsburgs to grant concessions to the Protestants and was a factor in the final official recognition of Protestantism. In the second half of the 16th c the French Calvinist party maintained that the Ottoman alliance should be used against Catholic Spain. Hungary, under Ottoman protection became a stronghold of Calvinism, to the extent that Europe began to speak of 'Calvino-turcismus'.

As Inalcik concludes, Ottoman intervention under Suleiman was an important factor not only in the rise of national monarchies such as in France, but also in the rise of Protestantism in Europe.

There is certainly an argument to be made that at this point, the Ottomans had indeed become a part of Europe's political and religious 'development', and that therefore, Suleiman's aims and ambitions were no more without basis than were the ambitions of Europe's emperors like Charles V and Ferdinand.

The conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71 was on the one hand a major victory for the Ottomans, on the other its downfall, for it generated the creation of a Christian alliance Spain, Venice, the Papacy which defeated the Ottomans at Lepanto in Oct 1571 greatest battle ever fought on the Mediterranean. The Ottomans lost 200 or 238 ships; losses on both sides 59,000 men! The Ottomans quickly recovered in terms of their fleet, Venice made peace and even paid a war indemnity but the view of the Ottomans as invincible was damaged.

The Ottomans soon found themselves at war in the west with the Hapsburgs and the East with the newly armed Safavids. Control over much of Hungary was lost and with it revenue.

The Ottomans continued, however, to play in European affairs. Although the St Bartholomew Day's Massacre had exterminated the Calvinists in France who supported the Ottomans, the Ottomans in turn began to court the Netherlands. As Spain's power grew, it was directed towards the Netherlands and England. Then in 1580, Spain had annexed the kingdom of Portugal and its colonies.


The Ottomans were conscious of the commercial interests of the Dutch and British, playing on their fears of Spanish control, even showing some support for renewing Portugal's power as an antidote to Spain's, and offering 'capitulations' -- special trading privileges within the empire.

In 1588, the Spanish armada was destroyed in the Mediterranean, but the Ottomans were not able to take advantage of the situation, having lost the short-lived power in the Mediterranean during the Spanish rule and with the defeat at Lepanto, the rebuilding of the fleet notwithstanding. It was used to protect Istanbul. This meant that the north African provinces gradually slipped from Ottoman control as well.

The Mediterranean became the theatre for the activities of all sorts of pirate activity, much of it seriously threatening Ottoman shipping. By the early 17th century, Istanbul was having difficulty keeping open supply and communication lines with its provinces in Syria and Egypt. At this point, the repercussions of these activities were being felt within the empire itself, which leads us to different topics of discussion. But we have been speaking here of the larger international relations aspects of Ottoman activity, both as seen by the Ottomans and Europeans, and to a lesser extent their Russian, African and Safavid neighbours. Purely from this point of view, it is difficult to see the ottomans as anything but a European player at the end of the sixteenth, the outset of the seventeenth century.